Iqbal v Geo TV Limited

The Claimant/Respondent, Salman Iqbal, is a prominent Pakistani media businessman and owner of the ARY Digital Network and news channel.

The Defendant/Appellant Geo TV Limited is an English company forming part of the Pakistan-based Jang media group, which produces the Urdu language news channel GEO News. Geo TV Limited is responsible for broadcasts of GEO News within the UK.

On 19 May 2022, around 5pm UK time, GEO News broadcast live coverage of a rally in Pakistan by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) political party, at which its Vice-President, Maryam Nawaz Sharif, gave an address, in which she spoke the words complained of by Mr Iqbal. Spoken or written summaries of those words appeared subsequently in eleven news bulletins broadcast on GEO News between 8pm and 5am UK time.

Mr Iqbal issued proceedings in libel in relation to the live broadcast and subsequent bulletins as published in England and Wales. GEO TV applied for summary judgment on its defence of qualified privilege under s. 15 Defamation Act 1996 on the basis that the broadcasts were fair and accurate reports of proceedings at “a press conference” within paragraph 11A of Schedule 1 to the Act and/or a “public meeting” within paragraph 12.

HHJ Lewis, at first instance, refused GEO TV’s application for summary judgment, holding that although some of the elements of the defence were made out (the broadcasts were fair and accurate reports of proceedings at a relevant public meeting), Mr Iqbal had a realistic prospect of success of defeating the defence on: i) the issue of whether the broadcasts were “matter which is not of public interest and the publication of which is

not for the public benefit” (which is excluded from the privilege by s. 15(3) DA 1996); and ii) the issue of malice, which, if proved, would defeat the privilege also.

GEO TV appealed.

GEO TV’s appeal challenged the finding that Mr Iqbal had a realistic prospect of success on the issues of s. 15(3) DA 1996 or malice. Mr Iqbal’s Respondent’s Notice challenged the first instance finding that he had no prospect of success on the other elements of the qualified privilege defence, and argued that the case as a whole was unsuitable for summary determination.

The issues were:

(i) Did the nature of the case make it inherently unsuitable for summary judgment?

(ii) If not, was the judge wrong to have:

a. summarily determined the applicability of s. 15(1) (read with Schedule 1 para. 12) DA 1996 (fair and accurate report of proceedings at a public meeting);

b. refused to summarily determine the applicability of s. 15(3) DA 1996 (of public interest and for the public benefit); and

c. refused to summarily determine the issue of malice?

As to the first issue, the case was not inherently unsuitable for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal noted the “salutary” and efficient process of summary judgment, especially in defamation cases where costs can quickly become disproportionate to the issues at stake. There was no reason on these facts to have awaited GEO TV’s Defence, since its case on qualified privilege had been amply set out. There was not enough substance behind the argument that the judge had conducted an impermissible “mini-trial”.

GEO TV was successful on all points within the second issue.

The live broadcast was a fair and accurate report of proceedings at a public meeting (the rally at which Ms Sharif spoke), being a meeting bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful purpose and for the furtherance or discussion of a matter of public interest (per Schedule 1 para. 12 DA 1996). The live broadcast and bulletins constituted a “report” of the proceedings – “[a] report of an event is an account of it, a statement that conveys information about what happened” [53]. Mr Iqbal’s argument that the judge below had

failed to define the “proceedings” was rejected – the question is only whether the reported matter is something that formed part of the meeting process. The verbatim live broadcast and later summary bulletins of what Ms Sharif had said about the Mr Iqbal at the meeting were “fair and accurate”.

The judge was wrong to have refused summarily to determine the applicability of s. 15(3) DA 1996 (“[t]his section does not apply to the publication to the public, or a section of the public, of matter which is not of public interest and the publication of which is not for the public benefit”). This section is to be interpreted such that the privilege is only lost if the matter is not of public interest and its publication not for the public benefit. In this case, the topic of the meeting was clearly of public interest, which was enough – the “seriousness of the allegations, the form of expression, the tone in which they were expressed, and matters of that kind” were “immaterial” [67].

In any event, the publication of the matter was also clearly “for the public benefit” – the judge below erred in refusing summary judgment on the basis of two irrelevant issues, being “the status of the information being reported” (when Parliament had determined the relevant types of information in Schedule 1) and “the question of what was known, or arguably should have been known, by the defendant” [70] – [90].

As for malice, the judge below should have gone further, having correctly identified that much of Mr Iqbal’s case on malice amounted to allegations of careless or irresponsible journalism rather than indicating malice. There was plainly no prospect of establishing malice in relation to a live broadcast, and the judge should not have given Mr Iqbal the benefit of assuming that his case in relation to the subsequent bulletins would improve from its current (inadequate) position. The evidence adduced to date by Mr Iqbal did not make it probable that GEO TV, or specifically any individual within it, knew or was reckless that the allegations complained of were false.

This judgment will now stand as the leading decision on the interpretation of s. 15 DA qualified privilege. Of particular importance is Warby LJ’s interpretation of s. 15(3) DA 1996, and how the provisions of that section fit with the other elements of the privilege, including the separate issue of malice.

It also gives a reminder of the importance of the summary judgment jurisdiction and the limitations of the argument that a “mini-trial” has been conducted, and the high threshold for a plea of malice.